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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JEFFREY C. SCOTT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is granted in this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2A-3(f). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of Burglary, a 
Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) and Theft a Second Degree Felony in 
violation of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) in the Second Judicial District Court in and for the 
County of Weber, State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde 
sitting with a jury. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not the search of defendant's vehicle 
was in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights under 
the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
1. The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States, nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
3. Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
"The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On the 5th day of December, 1987, a business 
located in Ogden, Utah known as Farr's Jewelry Company was 
burglarized. During the course of the burglary, a number of 
jewelry items, including rings, necklaces, watches, loose 
diamonds and other jewelry were stolen. Several days later on 
the 6th of December, 1987, the defendant was driving a Ford 
2 
Escort vehicle that was owned by a Steve Farmer with Mr. Farmer 
and his wife's permission. (See Transcript of the Suppression 
Hearing, Pg. 4) 
2. The Ford Escort and one other car were pulled over 
for a speeding violation by Officer Nester of the California 
Highway Patrol. (See Transcript, Pg. 19) 
3. The officer talked to the drivers of both vehicles 
and then requested consent to search both the interior of the 
vehicle and later the trunk of the vehicle. (See Transcript, 
Pgs. 6, 40) 
4. At the time that the officer made the request he 
testified that he did not have probable cause to make a 
warrantless search. (See Transcript, Pg. 42) 
5. The California Highway Patrol Troopers typically 
carry automobile consent forms. (See Tran$cript, Pg. 42) 
6. The officer used a consent form in searching the 
Cadillac, which was the other vehicle. (See Transcript, Pg. 46) 
7. The officer did not use a consent form in searching 
the Ford Escort. (See Transcript, Pg. 46) 
8. There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not 
the officer indeed got consent to search the vehicle. Jeff Scott 
testified that he did not give consent to search. (See 
Transcript, Pg. 5) 
9. Officer Nester testified that he was given consent 
to search the trunk of the vehicle. (See Transcript, Pg.22) 
10. Officer Nester did admit that had defendant, 
3 
Scott, objected to his search of the trunk that he may have gone 
ahead and searched it anyway. (See Transcript, Pg. 57, 69-70) 
11. Officer Nester also testified that there were 
other possible ways to legally search the vehicle including a 
parole search which could be obtained with little effort. (See 
Transcript Pg. 57) 
12. Witness, Lucy Turner, testified that the officer 
did not ask for permission to look into the trunk or attache 
case. (See Transcript, Pg. 80) She also does not recall the 
defendant, Jeff Scott, giving permission to look into the trunk. 
(See Transcript, Pg. 85) 
13. As a result of the search of the trunk, a satchel 
or attache case was found wherein a number of items of jewelry 
were contained. This was later connected to the Farr Jewelry 
burglary and theft in Ogden, Utah. As a direct result of the 
search, a number of witnesses were found, evidence was seized and 
the entirety of the State's case made. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The defendant, Jeffrey C. Scott, contends that his 
constitutional rights, as provided under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by 
Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution were violated by 
the search of the trunk. The defendant contends and the state 
has admitted that there was no probable cause to search the 
vehicle and therefore the only constitutional way of searching 
the trunk of the vehicle would be via a knowing and intentional 
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consent by defendant, Jeffrey Scott. Defendant contends, in the 
alternative, that first there was no consent by him or anyone 
else to search the vehicle and second, that if some form of 
consent were given, it was not a voluntary consent and was 
extracted by means of coercion or duress implied by the officer's 
actions at the scene of the stop and by the officer's statement 
that he would have gone ahead and searched the vehicle regardless 
of consent of any party. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution prohibits reasonable search and 
seizures.1 The Utah Constitution provides, in identical wording, 
these same rights on a State level. The Supreme Court has 
consistently maintained the position that wherever possible, a 
search of an individual, his home or his vehicle should be done 
pursuant to a warrant obtained from a neutral magistrate after a 
valid showing of probable cause for said search. Only in very 
limited circumstances will the Court allow searches in the 
absence of a warrant. Those limited instances include among 
others, a search incident to arrest to secure weapons and protect 
the officer and a consent search. 
1
 Mapp y. Ohio, 367 US 643, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 81 S Ct 1684 
(1961) in which the Supreme Court first recognized the Fourth 
Amendment's right against unreasonable searches and seizures to 
be enforceable against the States through the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and further that the exclusionary 
rule is the only remedy for violations of these Fourth Amendment 
rights prohibits. 
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In the present case, we do not have a search incident 
to arrest since at the time the search was conducted none of the 
individuals in either of the vehicles had been placed under 
arrest. The State is then required to rely upon the alleged 
consent given by defendant, Jeffrey Scott, to Officer Nester at 
the scene of the stop which was on a deserted stretch of 
California highway near the Nevada border. The Court therefore 
must determine first whether or not a consent was given and 
second if a consent was given if said consent was voluntarily 
given. The US Supreme Court in the Case of Bumper v. North 
Carolina, 391 US 543, 20 L Ed 2d 797, 88 S Ct 1788 (1968) held, 
"When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent 
to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has 
the burden of proving that the consent was, 
in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This 
burden cannot be discharged by showing no 
more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful 
authority.fl 
(Id at 548) 
In the Bumper decision, the Supreme Court was presented with a 
factual situation wherein the police approached the defendant's 
home and talked to the defendant's grandmother who was living in 
the home with the defendant. One of the Officers told the 
grandmother that he had a warrant to search the house and the 
grandmother thereinafter stated, "go ahead" and opened the door 
and allowed the search. In its decision, the Court held that 
consent in that circumstance was not freely and voluntarily given 
and therefore* reversed the defendant's conviction on that ground. 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has likewise held that the 
State has the burden of proving voluntariness of a consent in the 
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case of State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, Ut. App. 1988. The Court 
of Appeals in the Sierra case adopted the definition of voluntary 
as follows, 
"Voluntary consent is that which was in fact 
voluntary given and not the result of duress 
or coercion express or implied.11 
(Id at 980) 
See also, Schneckloth v. Bustamor^te, 412 US 218, 248, 
where the Supreme Court held, 
"We hold only that when the subject of a 
search is not in custody and the State 
attempts to justify the search of on the 
basis of his consent, the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that it 
demonstrate that the consent was in fact 
voluntarily given and not the result of 
duress, corrosion express or implied." 
Although the Court in Sierra remanded with instruction to the 
trial Court to make a factual determination with regards to the 
voluntariness of the consent, the Court in the present case is 
presented with sufficient evidence to rulel that the consent, if 
given, was a result of duress or coercion. In the present case 
we have a situation where the defendant is pulled over on a 
deserted stretch of California highway at approximately 10:00 at 
night. The officer is later joined by two other patrol vehicles 
and the scene quickly involves into a quasi police station type 
situation. Officer Nester directed the majority of his questions 
to defendant Scott who is the driver of t;he vehicle.2 In this 
2
 The defendant Scott has standing to object to the search 
of the vehicle notwithstanding the fact that ownership was in 
another person on the basis that it is clear that he had 
permission and possession of the vehicle at the time the search 
was conducted. See, State v. Larocco, 742 P. 2d 89, "the sole 
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situation, the officer vacillated several times between writing a 
ticket for speeding and conducting a search of the vehicle.3 
While appellant recognizes that the Appellant Court 
must look at the evidence in light most favorable to the 
respondent, defendant stands firm on his claim that no consent to 
search was ever given and furthermore logic would dictate that 
the consent was a convenient fabrication by Officer Nester to 
facilitate a search of the vehicle on a hunch. 
In the present case there are numerous undisputed facts 
which indicate the coerciveness of any consent which may have 
been taken. First it is undenied that no written consent form 
was ever obtained from Scott or any of the owners or occupants of 
the Escort vehicle. Secondly, there is no evidence that the 
police officer even took the time to read to the defendant, or 
any of the occupants of the Escort vehicle, the contents of the 
written consent form. 
The defendant admitted, during the suppression hearing, 
that he owned the brief case and knew the contents therein. 
Obviously, he also knew that the brief case was located in the 
trunk and that by searching the trunk and the brief case or 
satchel, the officer would find a large amount of jewelry and 
prerequisite to a defendant raising the Fourth Amendment issue is 
that he claims a proprietary or possessionary interest in the 
searched or seized property." (Id at 91) (Utah Appl. 1987) 
3
 The State does not contend that the search was made 
incident to arrest since the officer did not place the defendant 
or any of the parties under arrest until after the search of the 
trunk and the satchel had been completed. 
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suspect Mr. Scott of a theft. Logic dictates that an individual 
in that situation would not voluntarily consent to the search of 
vehicle absent some duress of coercion. 
The entire scenario on that desert highway late in the 
evening of December 6th reeks with efforts to coerce consent both 
expressly and impliedly. Finally, Officer Nester, the officer 
that conducted the search, admitted that had defendant Scott 
objected to the search, he may have gone ahead and searched the 
trunk and the contents of the trunk in any event, thus laying 
more credence to defendant's claim that the impermissible 
coercion as delineated in the Bumper decision was ever present 
during the entirety of the events of the evening. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that the defendant's 
constitutional rights were violated through a non-permissible 
search of the trunk of the Escort and the contents therein. The 
attempts at coercion and duress have been 
have the officer's disregard for the rights of individuals in 
that situation. Furthermore, the officer himself testified that 
there were other avenues available to obtain a search of the 
vehicle. First, there is a possibility that as some point down 
the road, the officer could have obtained) some sort of probable 
cause, although at the time of the search he testified that 
probable cause had not yet been obtained. Secondly, since the 
defendant was a paroled individual, he could have contacted his 
parole officer and conducted a parole search. Finally, there is 
blearly established as 
no indication that had a search not been conducted at that point 
in time, that evidence which the officer suspected was present 
would have been secreted away or destroyed. In any event, the 
defendant's constitutional rights under the Constitution of the 
United States and the State of Utah have been impermissibly 
violated. The only remedy for such violation is an application 
of the exclusionary rule and since all of the evidence obtained 
in the case is fruit of the poisonous tree, defendant7! 
conviction should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this, 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for ybefendani 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City^^Utah 841! 
postage prepaid this *=^/%v day of MarcJ^ , 1#8< 
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RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney at Law 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 621-5602 rc».< 
r r. - P ' 4i-
Itf Ttf£ SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
JEFF SCOTT, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CRIMINAL NO. \J\ ~)^?\ 
COMES NOW, Defendant, JEFF SCOTT, by and through 
his attorney, RANDINE SALERNO, and hereby moves that the Court 
suppress all evidence obtained pursuant to that certain search 
conducted on the 6th day of December, 1987, by K. Nester, 
California Highwas Patrol, and that the Court exclude all 
evidence obtained thereunder from use in any proceeding against 
the above-named Defendant, for the reasons outlined in the 
accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
DATED this /c^~- day of February, 1988. 
RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
,y 
I hereby certify that I madJrext' a true and correct 
copy of the enclosed Motion and Memorandum to: REED RICHARDS, 
Weber County Attorney , 7th Floor, Municipal Building, Ogden, UT, 
84401, on this S'/rt/, day of February , 1988. , -> 
- ~/l *;<- <r *} •£-/-£ ', 
NANCY CART{EJR, Legal Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTS STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * RONALD 0. HYDE, Judge 
* 
Plaintiff, * Cas£ No. CR-018629 
vs. * Dat|e: 2-22-88 
JEFFREY SCOTT, * Viclki Godfrey, Reporter 
Defendant. * S. |Taylor, Court Clerk 
This is the time sef for Motion to Suppress. 
CHARGE: BURGLARY 3RD DEGREE COUNT 1 and THEFT 2ND 
DEGREE 
Reed Richards, Esq. and Gary Heward, Esq. appearing in 
behalf of the State of Utah. 
Defendant was present and represented by Randine 
Salerno, Esq. 
Motion for the exclusionary rule was represented to the 
Court by defendants1 counsel. 
Court granted the motion and the witnesses to remain 
outside the courtroom during the proceedings. 
Opening statement by the defendant's counsel. 
State's counsel reserved opening statement at this time. 
Jeffrey C. Scott was sworn and testified direct 
examination by defendant's counsel. Crpss examination by Mr. 
Richards. 
DEFENSE RESTS: 
Tropper Kurt Nester was sworn and t e s t i f i e d d i rec t 
examination by Mr. Heward. Cross examination by the defendant 's 
counsel . Re-direct . Re-cross. Re-direct|. 
page 2 hearing 
ST. vs. Scott 
18629 2-22-88 
Lucy Turner was sworn and testified direct examination 
by Mr. Richards. Cross examination by the defendant's counsel. 
Re-direct. 
Shawn Bell was sworn and testified direct examination by 
Mr. Richards. Cross examination by the defendant's counsel. 
Re-direct. 
State's exhibits 1, 2, and 3 offered and received. 
STATE RESTS: 
Closing argument by defendant's counsel. 
Closing argument by Mr. Heward. 
Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. 
Matter is set for trial February 23, 1988 at 9:30 a.m. 
trial date to stand. 
that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q December 6th, 1987, you were traveling in a 
vehicle headed towards the Los Angeles, California area; is 
that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q what were you driving? 
A I was driving a 1987 Ford Escort. 
Q And who did that car belong to? 
A Well, it belonged to — his name is Steve 
Farmer. It was Sunday Farmer's husband's car. 
Q Was he with you? 
A No, he wasn't. 
Q Was his wife with ypu? 
A Well, his wife was there, but she wasn't in 
the same car with us. She was in the car following us. 
Q Were you driving the Ford Escort with her 
consent? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Did you have personal property in the car? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Did you have personal property in the trunk 
of the car? 
A Yes, I did. Well, no, I didn't have personal 
property inside of the car. Just in the trunk of the car. 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
Q 
were at approx 
A 
Q 
three vehicles 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
were going? 
A 
Q 
A 
Approximately six years. 
Would you please tell this Court where you 
imately 9:55 hours? 
I was at Interstate 15 and Afton Road. 
Did you have occasion to come in contact with 
? 
Yes, I did. 
What called your attention to the vehicles? 
The high rate of speed they were traveling. 
And did you attempt to ascertain how fast they 
Yes, I did. 
How did you do that? 
I did that by what is called a bumper pace. I 
matched the speed of my vehicle to the speed of the other 
vehicles which 
an hour. 
Q 
A 
! Q 
A 
' Q 
! A 
and requested 
registration. 
showed the speed to be approximately 9 3 miles 
Did you initiate a stop? 
Yes, I did. 
Did you stop all three vehicles? 
All three vehicles were stopped. 
What happened at that point? 
I contacted the driver Scott of the Ford Escort 
his driverfs license and the vehicle 
19 | 
1
 Utah in the first place. So from that, he went to his car, 
2 he called in to see if I had any warrants, 1 guess, came out 
3 of his car, started writing the ticket, and he got like 
4
 halfway through the ticket, he stopped and went and searched 
5 inside of the car. He didn't find nothing. He came back, 
6 started writing the ticket again, stopped, put the ticket E>oo][ 
1 down and asked me, do you mind if I searched the trunk of the 
8 car. I said, yeah, I mind. He went, took the keys out of 
9 the ignition, opening the trunk on his own, was fiddling 
10 around in there for a little while, came up with the briefcas^ 
11 But oefore this, before he started searching, he told Shawn 
12 tie 11 and Sattiewhite to get out of the car. He searched 
13 inside the car, came bacK and said, mind if I search the car. 
14 I said, yeah, I mind. He went and took the keys out of the 
15 car, opened the trunk. He came out with a briefcase, asked 
16 everybody there who's is this. Nobody said nothing. He kind 
17 of looked at me and said, do you mind if I search this, and 
18 I said, yeah, I do mind. And from there, he took it upon 
19 himself, opened the briefcase, seen what was in it, and said 
20 to me and everybody else, okay, I see why nobody wants to 
21 claim the briefcase, there's a bunch of jewelry. i\sked us wh^re 
22 we was coming from, and called Utah and asked them if jewelry 
23 was coming up missing, because everybody said — they didn't 
24 say nothing about it being theirs. Some jewelry came up 
25 missing — wait a minute. Let me oack up some. Before he 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
)6 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q All right. isn't it true, Trooper Nester, 
that Jeff said, yeah, I mind? 
A 
Q 
trunk? 
A 
Q 
No, that is not true. 
He told you, yeah, go ahead and search the 
He said, sure, go ahead. 
And then you went and got the key to the 
ignition and opened the trunk? 
A 
opened the 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Jeff Scott got the keys out of the ignition and 
trunk. 
What did you see when you opened the trunk? 
A satchel sitting right on top in plain sight. 
What else was in the trunk? 
There was miscellaneous bags. I believe there 
was some Christmas type presents, a doll, some items like 
| that. 
Q 
!
 A 
Who was standing out there by the open trunk? 
Jeff Scott was to my immediate right, and Shawn 
Bell was and Sattiewhite were both up towards the right front 
| of the Escort. 
!
 Q 
A 
bags in the 
Q 
jthe bags in 
Did you ask Shawn about the bags in the trunk? 
I believe we did have a conversation about the 
trunk. 
Did she tell you it was okay if you searched ! 
the trunk? 
40 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
you only 
Q 
had 
A 
Q 
j you searched 
Paulis w 
relieve 
A 
ho ha 
that 
wasn f t on trie 
In reading the police report m this matter, 
one consent form left; is that correct? 
That's correct. 
And you had Nathanial holstin sign than oefore 
the cadillac? 
That's correct. I had given that to Officer 
>d also arrived, and handed it to him. I don!t 
he had the training as far as the drug -- he 
> highway patrol that long of a time. And I asked 
him, I nave one, go ahead and fill it out for the cadillac. 
At that 
to be ci 
further 
citation 
You told 
searched 
already 
point 
ted a 
,, it looked like i\athanial Holstin woula IDS aDle 
md released. However, Jeff Scott still required 
investigation, and I was not going to fill out a 
and 
Q 
have him sign it at that point-
wow, let's back up a little Dit, Trooper Nested 
me earlier that Sergeant Pitsor arrived after you 
the 
A 
Q 
briefcase? 
That's correct. 
All right. So at this point m time, you'd 
searched the trunk and the attache case? 
A 
Q 
it on the cad 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
And you didn't use the consent form, you used 
iliac? 
That's correct. 
Which was searched after Pitsor got there? 
- &£ i 
1 Q Just in the trunk? 
2 A Yeah. 
3 Q What happened that the police officers pulled 
4
 you over? 
5 A Well, I was going pretty fast, speeding, thatfd 
6 why he pulled me over, because I was speeding. All I remember) 
7 is looking in the mirror, seeing the highway patrol with the 
8 light on behind me. He pulled me over, he came up to the 
9 passenger side of the car, and he noticed that I had an empty 
10 beer bottle between my legs. rie asked me, do you always drivd 
11 with a beer bottle between your legs. I told him, no, I drun^j 
12 this a couple of hours ago because we stopped in Vegas to get 
13 gas and I bought a beer and I drink it, and I didn't want to 
14 throw it on the highway, so I kept it between my legs. But 
15 anyway, he asked me to step out of the car. I stepped out 
16 of the car. He asked me my name, which is true, I did give 
17 him Jeff Boyd. From that point, he walked over to the car to 
18 ask the people inside of the car what my name was, and I knew 
19 she was going to tell him my name was Jeff Scott, so I pulled 
20 my travel permit paper up because I knew she was going to tel]] 
21 him the truth. She told him my name. He came back, why don't} 
22 I arrest you now for giving me false information. I said, 
I 
23 well, that is my true name, it's on the birth certificate, butj. 
24 I go by Jeff Scott. Here's my travel permit from the 
25 California Parole Department saying it!s okay for me to be in 
1
 ' match through the computer system on that} name. 
2
 Q Were you able to do so? 
3
 I A No, no record appeared on that name 
Q So what did you do after that? 4 
5 A After that, when I had approahced the vehicle 
6 
14 
18 
was a beer bottle to have Scott exit, I noticed that there 
7
 between my legs. Then I returned to the vehicle and searched 
8 the interior of the vehicle for further open containers of 
9
 alcohol. 
10 Q Where were the other passengers at that time? 
! 
I 
11 A At that time, I asked Sha^/n Bell and 
12 Sattiewhite, who was seated in the rear of the Escort, to exit}. 
13 I the Escort so I could search the interioi:. 
Q Did you search the interior? 
15 I A Yes, I did. 
16 Q Did you find any other containers of beer? 
17 I A No, I did not. 
Q What did you do at that point? 
19 I A I then asked Scott for colnsent to search the 
20 trunk of the vehicle. 
21 Q What was his response? 
22 A He said, go ahead, you ca(n search the trunk. 
23 Q Where were the keys to the trunk? 
24 A They were in the ignition. 
25 Q All right. And how was the trunk opened? 
22 
1
 A No, he does not. 
2 Q So he tells you his correct name after you 
3
 talk to the person on the other side of the car who identifie 
4
 him? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q Officer Nester, what woulqi you do if the 
7 defendant said no, don't search? 
8 A At that time, I would have probably developed 
9 more -- I had a few other options. One was a parole search. 
10 I could have called his parole officer and also advised him 
11 of the parties he was with, and being a potential parole 
12 violater. Even though he did have that pass with him, he may 
13 not necessarily supposed to be with Sattiewhite, for example. 
14 Also, for a parole type search and to advise his parole 
15 officer, then we were developing probable cause to the point 
16 where we may have been able to search at that point without 
17 consent. 
18
 Q If at the point you asked him for consent to 
19 search the vehicle, if you said, do you mind if I search and 
20 he said yes, I mind, would you have gone ahead and searched? 
21 A Right at that point? 
22 Q Yeah. 
23 A I don't know if I would have or not. I 
24 don't — 
25 Q Let's talk about the drug training. Counsel 
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1
 concerned about your searching his trunk and he didn't want 
2 you in there without a warrant. 
3 A Then I would have went through some other 
4
 channels, such as contacting his parole officer, further 
5 questioning of him. 
6 Q And then searched the trunk? 
7 A Possibly. 
8 Q Based upon these same factors that we've 
9 already discussed? 
10 A Possibly. 
11 Q When you found this attache case after searching 
12 the trunk without consent based upon these factors, and you 
13 open the trunk and right away this jumps right out of it, you 
14 would assert to that one, too, wouldn't you? 
15 A I'm not sure I understand the question. 
16 Q Well, if you would have searched the trunk 
17 without a warrant, you would have searched that without a 
18 warrant; isn't that correct? 
19 A Yes, based on consent, yes. 
20 Q No, without the consent. We were talking 
21 about a hypothetical here. You weren't sure -- if you didn't 
22 have consent, you weren't sure whether or not you would have 
23 gotten a warrant. You may very well have searched it without 
24 a warrant. That's what you said? 
25 A That's possible. 
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1 Q If you would have searched the trunk without a 
2 warrant, for whatever reason, without consent, would you have 
3 also searched the attache case? 
4 A Yes, that's correct 
5 Q You would not have takers possession of the 
6 attache case, taken it to the courthouse, gone to a magistrate 
7 J gotten a warrant first? 
3 I A I don ft know that for a fact yet at this point 
9 I Q When you picked the attache case out of the 
10 
11 
12 
trunk, you had possession of it, didn't you? 
A That's correct. 
Q It was in your hands before you opened it? It 
13 I was outside the trunk and in your hanqls; isn't that correct? 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q You had all the defendants contained, you knew 
16 where they were, you were protecting yourself, you haa three 
17 of them in one vehicle and the other three standing away from 
18 you so they couldn't do anything to ^ou physically,- is that 
19 correct? 
20 J A Well, Jeff Scott, I think I testified to 
21 | earlier, was standing near by at the) trunk area with me 
22 I Q It would have been re'al easy for you to put 
this attache case in your car, wouldn't it? 
A I don't know what you mean by that, ma'am. 
23 
24 
25 I Q To take it to a magistrate, to get a warrant 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
police put it 
nobody wanted 
Q 
looking in it 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
in the case. 
something in 
up here and asked, who did this belong to, and 
to claim in. 
Did they then ask if anyone objected to them 
? 
No. 
What happened next? 
He looked in it. 
Did he show it specifically to Mr. Scott? 
First of all when he got the case, he looked 
Then he said, urn, some interesting jewels or 
here, who does this belong to, and nobody wanted( 
to claim up to i t . 
Q So nobody would claim that that was their case"} 
A No. 
Q Shortly after that, all of you were taken down 
to the police station in Barstow; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you,. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. SALERNO: 
Q Miss Turner, you were in the cadillac; is that 
correct? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q What seat were you occupying in the cadillac? 
A In the rear. 
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4 
6 
1
 Q What did he say? 
2 A He just asked, do you mind if we look in the 
3
 I trunk, and I don ft know if Jeff said yes or no. 
Q Was Jeff facing you, facing the trooper, 
5 I facing the Escort? 
A He was — the car was lined up in a direction 
7
 like going south, and they was on the side and they was 
8 talking. You could read the lips but you couldn't really 
9 hear real good, but we had our window down. 
10 Q Did you have all the windows down in the 
11 Cadillac? 
12 A The two front ones. 
13 Q Not the back ones? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Did you have your radio going? 
16 A No. 
17 Q And you were still chatting with eachother? 
18
 A Uh-huh. Trying to hear, more or less. 
19 Q Where was Shawn Bell? 
20 A She was in the other car, in the Escort. 
21 Q Did you see Shawn and Robert Sattiewhite get 
22 out of the car so the trooper could search the car? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Did they stay out of the car after that; do yoTJi 
25 remember? 
